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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. Jurisdiction
has been challenged by Respondent. The Court made a final determination that it
has jurisdiction to review the matter in its Order of June 18, 2008.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case is a direct appeal from the final determination of the South Jordan
Employee Appeals Board issued on April 30, 2007. Petitioner commenced this
action by filing a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals on May 10, 2007. On
September 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Third District
Court under Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On June 16, 2008,
the Court set aside the transfer and reinstated the appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the South Jordan Employee Appeals Board misinterpret Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and erroneously conclude that Daniel Pearson was an atwill employee during his employment as Assistant Police Chief of South Jordan
City?
Standard of Review: Legal conclusions and mistakes of law are reviewed
under a correctness standard, without deference to the administrative agency. See

1

Utah County v. Alexanderson, 71 P.3d 621 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); State v. Barrett,
127 P.3d 682 (Utah 2005).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Terms of Employment at Hiring

Prior to July 15, 2002, Respondent recruited Mr. Pearson for the position of
Assistant Police Chief. Mr. Pearson was told that it was a merit position, whereby
he could only be terminated for cause (i.e. for misconduct). See Excerpts of
Appeals Board Hearing Transcript, pg. 12-14, 33 (attached herein at Exhibit A).1
On July 15, 2002, Respondent "officially" extended a written offer of employment.
See Employment Contract (attached herein at Exhibit B); see also Exhibit A, pg. 1416, 82, 84-88.2 The offer stated that only "Probationary and Department Heads"
were employed at-will. Id. Throughout his employment Mr. Pearson's superior,
Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd, made statements confirming Mr. Pearson's merit
status. See Exhibit A, pg. 16-17, 31.
B.

Termination of Employment

On January 30, 2007, Respondent, through City Manager Rick Horst,

lr

The portions of the transcript provided in Exhibit A are merely examples of evidence
concerning the point at issue. The Exhibit does not contain all of the relevant portions of the transcript.
2

All Exhibits to this Brief are part of the record before the Court.
2

terminated Mr. Pearson from his position without cause or explanation. Mr.
Pearson was immediately asked to sign a waiver of any right to appeal the
termination, which he declined to do. See Id. Mr. Horst issued Mr. Pearson a
termination letter stating that the termination was based on his "at-will" status. See
Termination Letters (attached herein at Exhibit C). The following day, Mr. Pearson
gave Respondent notice that he would appeal Respondent's claim that he was an
"at-will" employee. Respondent, again through Mr. Horst, issued a response letter
on February 8, 2007, informing Mr. Pearson that his at-will status was mandated by
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. See Exhibit C.
C.

Internal Appeals

In accordance with Respondent's written grievance procedure, Mr. Pearson
appealed the termination to his immediate supervisor, Police Chief Lindsay
Shepherd, then to Assistant City Manager, John Geilmann, and finally to
Respondent's Employee Appeals Board. See Dan Pearson Grievances (attached
herein at Exhibit D). Both Lindsay Shepherd and John Geilman affirmed Mr.
Horst's position without explanation. See Respondent's Denial Letters (attached
herein at Exhibit E). In fact, they labeled Mr. Pearson an "appointed" at-will
employee. See Id.
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On April 27, 2007, the Appeals Board held a quasi-judicial hearing. Both
parties offered testimony and were entitled to cross-examination. Respondent's
attorney, Assistant City Manager John Geilmann, stipulated that Mr. Pearson's
termination was without cause and that it was based entirely on Mr. Pearson's
alleged at-will status. See Exhibit A, pg. 19-20. His questions and statements
focused on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and its legal significance. See Id., pg. 2526, 38. On April 30, 2007, the Appeals Board issued a final determination that Mr.
Pearson was an at-will employee during his service as Assistant Police Chief and
upheld his termination. See Exhibit E.
D.

Exclusive Basis for Final Determination

Unfortunately, the Appeals Board's final decision did not offer a clear
statement of its factual and legal analysis. This suggests that the Appeals Board's
decision was based solely on Mr. Horst's original conclusion that Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1105 mandates Mr. Pearson's at-will status. Had the Appeals Board based
its determination on the factual evidence presented at the hearing, it would have
addressed those facts in the decision.
Respondent confirmed that the decision was based on Mr. Horst's orginal
statutory interpretation on December 14, 2007, when it filed its Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition of Appeal (attached herein at Exhibit
4

F). The Memorandum sets forth two interpretations of § 10-3-1105. First,
Respondent believes that for purposes of § 10-3-1105, "assistant police chiefs" are
the same as "deputy police chiefs." See Exhibit F. Second, Respondent believes
that § 10-3-1105 mandates the at-will status of all municipal "deputy police chiefs."
See Id. Accordingly, Respondent concludes that Mr. Pearson, a municipal
Assistant Police Chief, was mandatorily an at-will employee. This explains why
Respondent has never acknowledged or addressed Mr. Pearson's compelling
evidence. Under Respondent's legal interpretations, no set of facts can change the
statutory mandate.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I: Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 protects Mr. Pearson from being an
at-will employee. Section 10-3-1105 protects all municipal positions not
specifically excluded. Section 10-3-1105 excludes "deputy" police chiefs, but
does not exclude "assistant" police chiefs. The plain language of the statute
demonstrates that these two titles are distinct.
Point II: Even if Mr. Pearson were a deputy police chief for purposes of
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, there is no mandate that he be an at-will employee.
Section 10-3-1105 confers rights on certain municipal employees, it does not take
away or limit the rights of others. Municipalities may still give deputy police chief
5

employment rights above those of an at-will employee, including full merit
employee status.
ARGUMENT
THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD INCORRECTLY
INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1105 AND
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT Mr. PEARSON
WAS AN AT WILL EMPLOYEE.

1.

Respondent's Appeals Board Erroneously Concluded that Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1105 Did Not Protect Mr. Pearson.
Subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1) reads as follows:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a
municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as
provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(emphasis added).
The corollary statute, § 10-3-1106, lists several specific limitations on a

municipality's ability to terminate a municipal employee. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-31106 (i.e. "may not be discharged . . . incident to, or through changes, either in the
elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments." Because an at-will, by
definition, does not enjoy any rights, employees protected by § 10-3-1105 cannot
be at will.

6

The policy behind the statute seems clear: the state legislature wants to
ensure that municipalities give their employees an adequate level of job security.
Without statutory protection, city managers would have too much discretion and
could begin running the city as if it were their own private business.
Of course, there are a few positions within municipalities where too much job
security would be counterproductive. Appointed and political positions benefit
from a significant amount of discretion. The legislature has accounted for this in
subsection (2) of § 10-3-1105, where eleven (11) specific positions are excluded
from the protections otherwise granted to all municipal employees:
(2) Section (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body
exercising executive power in the municipality.
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire
department who is a member of the classified civil service in a
first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(emphasis added).

7

Respondent relies on its own interpretation of § 10-3-1105 to conclude that
Mr. Pearson is among those excluded from subsection (1). It believes that, for
purposes of the statute, a "deputy police chief is the same as an "assistant police
chief." Respondent would say that subsection (2) should be read as stating:
"Subsection (1) does not apply to . . . (d) a deputy or assistant police chief of the
municipality." This meshing of the term deputy and assistant is inconsistent with
the express distinctions of the statute, other sections of the Utah Code, and
Respondent's own employment structure.
Immediately following subsection (2)'s listing of excluded positions within
the police force, it lists the excluded positions within the fire department:
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
Id. (emphasis added).
The statute makes a specific distinction between "deputies" and "assistants."
Clearly, the drafters would not have placed the additional language or assistant into
the statute were the two positions identical. If the distinction was inserted for mere
clarification (i.e. to make sure the reader understands that assistants are included), it
would have made a similar statement in its reference to deputy police chiefs. The
inclusion of assistants in referencing fire chiefs and not police chiefs demonstrates
8

that the exclusion of assistant police chiefs was intentional.
Distinctions between assistants and deputies are found throughout the Utah
Code. For example, § 77-23a-8 references "assistant attorney general/' despite
referring to several other positions as deputies:
(1) The attorney general of the state, any assistant attorney general
specially designated by the attorney general, any count attorney,
district attorney, deputy county attorney, or deputy district attorney
specifically designated by the county attorney or by the district
attorney, may . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8.
These same distinctions are found in other position's within Respondent's
municipality. For example, Respondent's appointed employees include Gary
Whatcott as Deputy City Manager and John Geilmann, Rob Wall and Laurie
Tanner as Assistant City Managers. See List of South Jordan Appointed Positions
(attached herein at Exhibit G).
Respondent relies on Mr. Pearson's job description as evidence that he was
the equivalent of a deputy police chief. See Assistant Police Chief Job Description
(attached herein at Exhibit H). This position disregards Respondent's duty to
observe Utah's title specific statutory scheme. A job description cannot change
the position's title where the title has legal significance under the Utah Code. Both
parties agree that Mr. Pearson's title was Assistant Police Chief. This title must be
observed under the law. Employees like Mr. Pearson must be able to rely on their

9

title in reviewing title-specific state and local employment laws. Respondent has a
duty to conform its titles to the law, not the other way around.
Moreover, even if Mr. Pearson's job description were relevant, the
description is not consistent with that of a full deputy police chief or with the type
of position the legislature intended to exclude from § 10-3-1105. Mr. Pearson's
title states:
General Purpose
Assumes total responsibility for the [police] department in the absence
of the Public Safety Director; assists in the development of department
programs; performs various administrative and managerial duties as
assigned by the Chief.
Supervision Received
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety
Director. Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of the
Chief of Police.
Supervision Exercised
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly
through subordinate supervisors.
See Exhibit H.
The title of "deputy" police chief typically connotes full authority to stand in
and act as the police chief in the chiefs absence. See Deputy, Black's Law
Dictionary, 8th ed. (attached herein at Exhibit I). While Mr. Pearson's job
description gives him departmental "responsibility" in the absence of the Chief of
10

Police, it does not give him "authority" to stand in the Police Chiefs position. In
fact, the language describing Mr. Pearson's responsibility over the police force is
stronger in the absence of the Public Safety Director than in the absence of the
Police Chief.
Respondent's confusion regarding its own distinctions is highlighted by the
fact that two of Respondent's denials actually label Mr. Pearson as an "appointed"
at-will employee. Of course, Mr. Pearson has never been appointed by anyone,
and Respondent's own list of appointees does not include Assistant Police Chief.
See Exhibit G.
Collectively, it is clear that the statute does not exclude Assistant Police
Chiefs. There is no "wiggle room" to find in the alternative.
A.

Respondent's Mistake of Law Resulted in Mr. Pearson's Wrongful
Termination.

As a result of Respondent's mistake of law, Mr. Pearson was wrongfully
terminated as an at-will employee. He was deprived of his statutory employment
rights and the full merit rights independently guaranteed him by Respondent. The
Court need not determine the exact level of protections Mr. Pearson enjoyed under
§ 10-3-1106 or his employment contract. It is sufficient to find that he was not
subject to "at-will" termination. No interpretation of his actual rights can change the

11

fact that his employment was terminated on an incorrect interpretation of the law.
B.

Appropriate Relief

Since his termination, Respondent has not replaced Mr. Pearson with a new
Assistant Police Chief. Reinstatement is a viable option, and is Mr. Pearson's
preferred remedy, along with back payment for lost wages. This Court should use
its authority to issue an order to this effect.
2.

Even if Petitioner Were A Deputy Police Chief For Purposes of Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, Respondent's Appeals Board Erroneously
Concluded That The Statute Mandates His At-Will Status.

Even if Respondent's definition of deputy police chief is not materially
flawed, its conclusions regarding the statute's effect on deputy police chiefs are
clearly erroneous. Respondent claims that u[u]nder Utah law, a 'deputy police
chief and 'deputy of the head of a municipal department' are at-will employees
and have no entitlement to due process upon termination." See Exhibit F. That is, it
interprets the statute as removing the ability of municipalities to give deputy police
chiefs any type of protection or merit status. Under this view, the statute could be
read: "The positions listed in Subsection (2) shall be at-will employees, and may
always be terminated at any time for any reason."
Properly interpreted, the statute goes no where near stating that deputy police
chiefs must be at-will. Section 10-3-1105 affirmatively guarantees rights to certain
12

employees of municipalities; it doesn't take away the rights of others. The
excluded positions are listed only because it would be impracticable to list all of the
protected positions. Basic logic tells us that a guarantee of rights to some
employees from one source does not thereby preclude a guarantee of rights to all
others from a separate source. Applied to this case, the fact that a deputy police
chief does not get any benefit from § 10-3-1105 does not mean he or she can not
get similar or even better benefits direct from the municipality.
This interpretation is highlighted by the case of Kivett v. Marion County
Sheriff's Dept, 2007 WL 906470. In Kivett, the relevant part of the statute read:
"A special deputy may be removed by the sheriff at any time, without notice and
without assigning any cause . .." This language is much stronger than that of § 103-1105, and at first glance appears to create an absolute at-will status. The court,
however, refused to read into the statute anything that was not clearly stated:
Sgt. Kivett argues that [the statute] does not bar or limit the sheriffs
authority to enter into a contract that restricts his right to fire an
employee at-will. This Court agrees. By stating that a sheriff "may"
remove a special deputy at any time, without notice, and without
assigning any cause, the Legislature was clearly stating that special
deputies were not merit deputies, and could not claim the property
rights that the Legislature had afforded merit deputies. . . It was not
however, restricting the Sherifs right to bargain with non-merit
employees. . . Had the Legislature wished a different result, it could
have used different language, either by specifically limiting a sheriffs
bargaining authority . . . or by writing the statute in mandatary terms
13

stating, for example, that 'a special deputy shall be removed by the
sheriff at any time, without notice and without assigning any cause.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Kivett decision was based on the important principle that "in statutory
constitution, it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is
to recognize what it does say." Id. In the present case, the statute does not say that
deputy police chiefs are at-will employees. Indeed, it does not even approach the
language in Kivett which held that special deputies were not "merit employees."
Correctly interpreted, § 10-3-1105 has no real effect on the employment status of
deputy police chief or police chiefs at all.
A.

Respondent's Mistake of Law Resulted in Mr. Pearson's Wrongful
Termination.

Respondent's mistake of law caused the Appeals Board to abuse its
discretion. At the hearing before the Employee Appeals Board, Mr. Pearson
offered evidence that he was recruited for the position of Assistant Police Chief
under the express agreement that he would be a merit employee. See Exhibit A, pg.
12-16, 33, 82, 84-88; Exhibit B. The evidence included Mr. Pearson's employment
contract which states that he was not at-will. Id. Respondent had an obligation to
consider and make findings regarding this evidence, which it did not under the
mistaken belief that the evidence was irrelevant.
14

The evidence in the record is sufficient to make a finding that Mr. Pearson,
even if not protected by 10-3-1105, had negotiated for and received a level of
protected status. The exact degree of Mr. Pearson's employment rights is
irrelevant. As long as Mr. Pearson was not an at-will employee, his at-will based
termination was wrongful. If Respondent wishes to pursue termination on
permissible grounds, it can only do so after restoring Mr. Pearson to his pretermination status.
B.

Appropriate Relief

As previously indicated, Mr. Pearson's preferred remedy is full reinstatement
along with payment of lost wages and other appropriate relief This Court should
use its authority to issue an order to this effect.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing arguments, Mr. Pearson respectfully requests that this
Court overturn his termination and grant appropriate relief as requested herein.

(Signature Line of Following Page)

3

In the event that the Court agrees that there was a mistake of law and abuse of discretion, but
does not agree that the record demonstrates that he was not an at-will employee, the appropriate
remedy would be to remand the matter back to the Appeals Board for review in accordance with the
correct interpretations of law.
15
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Exhibit A
Excerpts of Trial Transcript

1

A.

1986, possibly.

2

Q.

'86?

3

A.

'96, I'm sorry.

4

Q.

So you would have been Assistant Chief for

5

approximately

6

right?

six years.

I'm not sure.

1996.

Does that sound about

7

A.

I think so.

8

Q.

Just tell the Board what you did generally

9

as Assistant Chief of Police for Midvale City.

10

A.

I handled operations, did all the

11

day-to-day operations, did the daily purchasing and

12

general budget management, handled

13

issues, was over scheduling, took complaints from

14

citizens.

15

of the police department.

16

Q.

I dealt with all of the operational

issues

And Midvale was a growing city at that

17

time.

18

Union area while you were there?

19

disciplinary

In fact, did Midvale City incorporate the Fort

A.

Yeah.

I oversaw the annexation of the

20

Fort Union area and handled all of the preparations

21

for that.

22

Q.

It was a very large annexation.
And was your involvement in that in any

23

way connected with your coming over to South Jordan

24

City?

25

A.

A little bit.

CITICOURT, LLC

1

Q.

How did that take place?

2

A.

I had had some conversations with the

3

Chief of Police, Lindsey Shepherd.

4

know that this position was available and that they

5

were growing rapidly and that I had some of the

6

qualifications that he thought would be good for the

7

job.

8

Q.

9

Shepherd

10

A.

11

He had let me

So when did your dialogue with Lindsey
start?
Sometime probably around the first of the

year, 2002, I would guess.

12

Q.

And who contacted who?

13

A.

We were at a meeting together and he

14

mentioned it.

15

talked about the position and what it was going to

16

entai 1.

17

Q.

And we had some dialogue about it,

And what was your understanding or

18

actually what was the conversation with respect to

19

the position?

20

A.

Just that South Jordan was growing rapidly

21

and that they were ready now to put on an Assistant

22

Chief of Police position; that it entailed basically

23

a lot of the duties that I was currently doing,

24

had expressed to him during several of those

25

conversations that I wasn't interested

CITICOURT, LLC

in being a

I

1

I Chief of Police and that being Assistant Chief of

2

I Police was what I was comfortable doing and what I

3

enjoyed and that I may be interested in the job.

4
5

Q.

And why would you not have wanted to be a

Chief of Police?

6

A.

I made it clear to Lindsey early on that

7

I - and in several subsequent conversations - that I

8

was not interested in being a Chief of Police.

9

was too volatile a position, and that I wasn't going

10

It

to give up job security to do that.

11

Q.

What do you mean by "job security"?

12

A.

A Chief of Police serves at the will of

13

the city and can be terminated without cause for

14

whatever reason.

15

that type of position.

16
17

Q.

And I wasn't interested

in having

Do you understand the concept of what's

called a merit or nonmerit employee?

18

A.

I do.

19

Q.

And when you worked at Midvale City, what

20

was your understanding as to your status

21

A.

there?

I had a signed agreement that was very

22

definitive that explained exactly what my position

23

was.

24

had the permanent secured rank of lieutenant.

25

they removed me from the assistant police job for any

When I took the Assistant Chief of Police job I

CITICOURT, LLC
801.532.3441

So had

1

reason other than misconduct, I would have gone back

2

to the rank of lieutenant.

3
4
5

Q.

Okay.

And why would you have left that

type of job security to come over to South Jordan?
A.

I understood that when I came here, I knew

6

that there would be a probationary period.

I

7

understand very clearly that a probationary

employee

8

can be let go for whatever reason during probation.

9

I was confident that I could complete, successfully

10

complete, probation and that I could do the job.

11

I believed wholeheartedly that as soon as that

12

probation was completed, that my position would no

13

longer be an at-will employee, that I could just go

14

down the road.

15

all the documents that I signed when I came here.

16

was very specific that department heads and

17

probationary employees were at-will, which is exactly

18

as I understood it.

19
20

Q.

And

And that was further reinforced by

Okay.

It

And did you serve the probationary

period here at South Jordan?

21

A.

I did.

22

Q.

When was that?

23

A.

In January of 2003 I received an

24

evaluation and a notice that I had successfully

25

completed my probation, and congratulating me on it.

CITICOURT, LLC
801.532.3441

1

Q.

At that point, did you have an

2

understanding that you were no longer an at-will or

3

probationary

employee?

4

A.

Absolutely.

5

Q.

What was that based on?

6

A.

It was based on the documents I had signed

7

when I came to work here.

It was based on

8

conversation I had with Lindsey Shepherd

9

the position.

concerning

It was based on my understanding of

10

state law.

11

way municipalities conduct business; that their

12

department heads serve at-will.

13

understanding -- I had reviewed South Jordan City

14

policies.

15

policy that established an at-will position for an

16

Assistant Chief or any other supervisory

17

employee.

18

I left South Jordan City, there was nothing in City

19

policy that differentiated

20

Chief of Police as being someone who is at-will and

21

served at the pleasure of the city manager.

22

Q.

It was based on my understanding of the

It was based on my

There was nothing in a South Jordan City

There was nothing.

capacity

And up until the time

the position of Assistant

You talked about conversations with the

23

Chief.

24

they related to your status as a merit employee.

25

A.

Tell the Board about those conversations as

Well, not long after I came here, the City

CITICOURT, LLC
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1

I decided

to try this public safety c o n c e p t .

They made

2

| several changes that South Jordan has done; changes,

3

I changes, changes.

But through all of this,

was made the director of public

Lindsey

4

Shepherd

5

came to me and explained

6

was a real

7

Chief of Police but he said, "You need

8

that you're not really going to be the acting Chief

9

of Police.

issue.

safety.

in great detail

that

He wanted me to be the

He

there

acting

to understand

It's going to be a t i t l e , because I have

10

an issue with

retirement, and I cannot go and claim

11

to be the Director of Public Safety

12

mess up my Police Chief retirement.

So I'm going

13

maintain

You will be an

14

Acting C h i e f , and once I get the issues

15

my r e t i r e m e n t , then we will talk about it.

16

are kind of in that position but you're

because it will

the title of Police C h i e f .

17

We had that conversation

So you

really not."

several times.

understood

19

to him in every conversation, as I did a subsequent

20

conversation

21

interest

22

be the C h i e f , so he would have to make

23

prior to that retirement issue being

24

I had no interest
Q.

Clearly understood

with

18

25

it.

resolved

to

it.

I explained

with Gary Whatcott, that I had no

in giving up my job security

in any way to
decisions

resolved

because

in the job of Chief of Police.

That position as public

CITICOURT, LLC
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safety for the

I

1

I ever left Midvale

2

I

3

City?

A.

Absolutely

never.

Q.

Let's talk about your job

4

while you were here at South Jordan.

5

tell the Board about

6

A.

7

--

MR. GEILMANN:
Mr. Chairman.

9

an at-will employe.

What can you

that?

W e l l , I'm

8

performance

Objection your Honor, or

Job performance is not an issue with
The determination

is whether or

10

not he is an at-will employee.

11

at-will e m p l o y e e , then any issue with

regard

12

performance

at-will

13

employee, that's a different issue, a different

14

matter to be heard.

15

is moot.

And if he is an

If he is not an

MR. SKORDAS:

If they are willing

16

stipulate that his termination had nothing

17

world whatsoever

18

employee, then we won't get into that.

to do with his p e r f o r m a n c e

19

MR. WOLTHIUS:

20

purposes of this hearing, that if both

21

the same page with respect to this being

22

focused on and dealing with the at-will

23

then I don't think that it's necessary

24

the job p e r f o r m a n c e , either.

25

MR. GEILMANN:

And I think

That would

CITICOURT, LLC
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to

in the
as an

that for
sides are on
specifically
issue alone,
to get

into

be the position

1

of the

City.

2
3

MR. W O L T H I U S :

MR. S K O R D A S :

5

goes to c r e d i b i l i t y ,

6

two q u e s t i o n s

7

talk a b o u t

8

about

Not e n t i r e l y .

and I'm

want Mr. P e a r s o n

to state for the r e c o r d

11

evaluations

12

think we h a v e a p r o b l e m with

13

we need

14

determination

and never had

any

to spend
of

if you

that he was

negative

or s o m e t h i n g to that e f f e c t ,
it.

But

I don't

I don't

think

a lot of t i m e on it if it's just a
at-will.

15

MR. S K O R D A S :

16

MR. W O L T H I U S :

That's

all

I intend

Would Mr. Geilmann

to d o .
be

to s t i p u l a t e to that?

18

MR. G E I L M A N N :

I stipulate

to that,

MR. W O L T H I U S :

All

Then

your

Honor.

20
21

to

W e l l , I t h i n k that

a good e m p l o y e e

19

to ask one or

that.
MR. W O L T H I U S :

willing

just g o i n g

I do think it

it. I t h i n k he is e n t i t l e d

10

17

Mr.

Skordas?

4

9

Is that y o u r p o s i t i o n ,

see any need

22

to get

into

MR. S K O R D A S :

23

Q.

24

specifically

25

of

right.

I don't

it.
Okay.

(By M r . S k o r d a s )
for South J o r d a n

What

did you do

as an A s s i s t a n t

Police?

CITICOURT. LLC

Chief

1

I

2

I BY MR. GEILMANN:

3
4

CROSS

Q.

EXAMINATION

Chief Pearson, you indicate you were hired

by the City in 2002; is that correct?

5

A.

Yes, sir.

6

Q.

And were you aware, at the time of your

7

hire, of the state statute that dealt with public

8

employees, particularly those who are

9

municipality?

employees of a

10

A.

Absolutely was.

11

Q.

And do you recall in 2002 that statute

12
13

allowed for the termination of police
A,

Yeah.

officers?

I believe that it allowed for some

14

of that activity.

15

because there's a state statute, you have to have

16

consistent policies and procedures within the City

17

that give general rules and guidelines for those

18

employees.

19

city and not others and have inconsistencies.

20

Jordan's policies and procedures are what prevail in

21

this matter, and South Jordan's policies were silent

22

on the i ssues.

23

Q.

But the caveat to that is just

You can't single out one employee in a
South

We will make those as legal arguments in a

24

few minutes.

I just wanted to make sure that you

25

understood at the time you hired, that there was a

CITIC0URT, LLC
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1

certain statute in place that controlled municipal

2

employees, and particularly police officers.

3

A.

It said that that could be done.

4

Q.

That they could be released without --

5

that they were at-will employees?

6
7

A.

But it did allow for some people to be at-will, yes.

8
9

Q.

Very good.

Thank you.

Are you aware that

that law was changed in 2004?

10
11

I'm not sure of the exact terminology.

A.

I became aware after that law was changed

that they had changed the law, yes.

12

Q.

And are you aware of what that law is

14

A.

Yes, I am.

15

Q.

What is your recollection of what that law

13

16
17

today?

is today?
A.

That law states that a Deputy Police Chief

18

is exempt from that statute that it cites with

19

regards to protection; a Deputy Police Chief or an

20

Assistant Fire Chief or Deputy Fire Chief, as well as

21

superintendents and several other categories of

22

people.

23

Chief of Police.

24
25

Q.

But it is silent on the issue of Assistant

When did you become aware of that changed

statute that took place in 2004?

CITIC0URT, LLC

1

I saying that your understanding was when you talked

2

with him about not wanting to be the Chief or when

3

you talked about your position as Acting Chief, that

4

in your mind that meant not at-will.

5

context.

6

DAN PEARSON:

I had a very

That was the

specific

7

discussion concerning the fact that I was not willing

8

to place myself in the position of being at-will.

9

MR. WALL:

10

Okay.

DAN PEARSON:

And made it very, very

11

clear.

And there was never any comment either from

12

him or from Gary Whatcott when I talked to him

13

stating, "Well, you're at-will," or something like

14

that.

Nothing whatsoever.

15

MR. WALL:

Could you just take a minute

16

and elaborate?

17

you said that your -- during your employment here at

18

the City, talk to us a little bit about what was your

19

final decision-making authority, on what types of

20

matters,

21

This is just the last question.

DAN PEARSON:

22

point

we were a t .

23

position

24

report

25

reported

to

of

it

But b a s i c a l l y

officers

report

lieutenants,
to Chief

Well,

Shepherd.

depended on what

I was always

to sergeants,

lieutenants
That's

CITICOURT, LLC

When

in a

sergeants

reported

t o me.

basically

I

t h e way

1

I

MR. WOLTHIUS:

2

I application for that position?

3

DAN PEARSON:

4

MR. WOLTHIUS:

What did you do in terms of

I don't recall.
Do you recall if you had

5

filled out some kind of a standard city

6

form or just submitted a resume or curriculum vitae?

7

DAN PEARSON:

I submitted

application

a resume.

I

8

don't know if I did that like one-page

application.

9

I did a background packet for them and submitted that

10

after -- you know, during the job offer stage.

11

again, it was during that job offer stage where it

12

was really solidified to me that I would not be

13

at-will because the paper I was given, signed by

14

human resources specifically, said who was at-will

15

employees in the City.

16

clearer.

17
18

And

It couldn't have been

MR. WOLTHIUS:

And who made the offer of

employment?

19

DAN PEARSON:

It was signed by Shelly

20

Chapman who was in charge of human resources at the

21

ti me.

22

MR. WOLTHIUS:

Okay.

And based upon that

23

offer, you accepted the employment.

24

DAN PEARSON:

25

MR. WOLTHIUS:

Yes, I did.
And so when you terminated

CITICOURT, LLC

1

any e v i d e n c e

2

to w a l k you

3

what we

has been p r e s e n t e d .
through

this w h o l e

But

I'd

just

like

packet

and

show

you

have.

4

MR.

WOLTHIUS

That's

5

MR.

GEILMANN

That' s fine?

6

MR.

WOLTHIUS

Uh-huh

7

MR.

GEILMANN

Thank

8

statute

9

Title

that's

applicable

10, Chapter

you.

duration

11

exceptions.

12

on S e c t i o n

13

references,

after

14

the h e a r i n g

p r o c e s s , et c e t e r a ,

of e m p l o y m e n t

And p a r t i c u l a r l y

And

there, I have

16

city o r d i n a n c e s

17

department

directors

18

management

positions within

19

course

20

the p r o c e d u r e

21

separation

of C h i e f

22

applicable

process

23

Any q u e s t i o n s

24

later,

25

included

the C i t y .

And

then

CITIC0URT, LLC
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of

be o p e r a t i n g

but are there any q u e s t i o n s

today.

city

at the time of

So t h i s would

I'll

m

about

appropriate

procedure.

that we w o u l d

oni

focus

it

the d u t i e s of

that was in p l a c e

that?

with

talks

and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t

Pearson.

issue,

that we are in

the a p p l i c a b l e g r i e v a n c e

in this

then

included

that deal w i t h

the

and

that, 1 0 - 3 - 1 1 0 6 w h i c h

about

is

we are g o i n g to

2 ( b ) of that s t a t u t e .

From

First,

1 1 0 5 that d e a l s

10

15

(affi rmati v e ) .

in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r

3, S e c t i o n

and t e r m i n a t i o n

fine.

was

the
the
under.
for

a b o u t what we

have

1

I

2

I question:

3

I reflects that Dan Pearson is an at-will employee, is

4

Q.

And let me see if you will answer this
There is nowhere on this document that

there?

5

A.

That' s correct.

6

Q.

And if you turn to the next page, this

7

two-page job description.

Are you with me on that?

8

A.

I am,

9

Q.

The City wrote that up, too, didn't they?

10

A.

Someone from the City.

11

Police Chief.

12

Q.

I would assume the

And tell the Board on this job description

13

where it says that the Assistant Police Chief is an

14

at-will employee.

15

A.

16

Take your time.

Thank you.
I don't

see a n y t h i n g

The j o b

description

reflecting

17

Q.

18

Police Chief,

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

You stated a minute ago that you preferred

21
22
23
24
25

is

titled

that.

Assistant

correct?

the title "Deputy Chief of Police," correct?
A.

I referred that I prefer the title

"deputy" in general.
Q.

Can you produce today a document created

by you during the entire five-year period that Dan

CITICOURT, LLC
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JJ

1

Pearson

2

him

3

Police?

worked

in any

for M i d v a l e

City

w h e r e you

f a s h i o n at all as a D e p u t y

4

A.

Excuse me.

You m e n t i o n e d

5

Q.

Excuse me.

South J o r d a n

6

A.

Okay.

7

before

To my -- I d o n ' t

referred

Chief

City?

City.
have

anything

me.
Q.

In fact, no such d o c u m e n t

9

A.

Not to my

10

Q.

Let's go to the next p a g e ,

11

the f l o w

12

certainly

13

"Deputy

chart,

Chief

colored

use your p r e f e r r e d

of P o l i c e , " d o e s

sir.

That's

one t h e r e .
language

No.

15

Q.

T h e next page t h e r e , not q u i t e so

doesn't

17

of P o l i c e "

r e f l e c t your p r e f e r r e d
a n y w h e r e , does
It does

19

Q.

Let's go to the next

will.

21

Police"?

22

A.

It does

23

Q.

And f i n a l l y ,

A.

it reflect

there

page,

"Deputy

sir, if you

Chief

of

not.
the s t a t i o n e r y ,

undated,

"Deputy C h i e f of P o l i c e , " does

It does

Chief

not.

20

reflect

pretty,

it?

A.

doesn't

of

t i t l e of " D e p u t y

18

Does

That

it?

A.

16

it?

knowledge.

the pretty,

doesn't

exists, does

14

25

of

Midvale

8

24

to

not.

CITICOURT, LLC
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it?

1

him

sign
A.

2
3

it,

correct?
A human

resource

officer

Q.

5

reflect

6

it?

And n o w h e r e
that Dan

on this d o c u m e n t

Pearson

is an a t - w i l l

7

A.

As I read

8

Q.

Show me on this d o c u m e n t

that

Dan

10

Pearson

A.

it,

it r e f l e c t s

is an a t - w i l l

should

12

so in my mind

13

not.

know that

if your

it d o e s n ' t

it

reflects

says,

"You

are

correct?

16

A.

Shelly C h a p m a n

17

Q.

She r e p r e s e n t e d

18

this d o c u m e n t ,

19

A.

this

document,

apparently

did,

the City w h e n

yes.
she

drafted

she?

sure how to answer

20

the h u m a n

21

question

as to her a u t h o r i t y

22

the City

in that

23

Q.

A.

where

say you are or that you

15

25

--

and

And the C i t y d r a f t e d

resource officer.

the b o t t o m ,

that

does

is a t - w i l l , "

Q.

I'm not

it

employee,

the s e n t e n c e

employment

14

didn't

does

employee?

All I see is that

11

24

Chapman

di d, yes .

4

9

Shelly

I would

that.

have

She was

some

to be a b l e to

represent

capacity.

It has the C i t y ' s

stationery

correct?
It d o e s .

CITICOURT, LLC
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1

down

there

on

1

I

Q.

If you go to the termination letter,

2

I January 30, 2007, that's the very first time in all

3

of history where the words "at-will" are used in

4

connection with Dan Pearson in any written document

5

created by South Jordan City, correct?

6
7

A.

I don't know.

I

haven't reviewed all documents.

8
9

I can't answer that.

Q.

Have you ever seen a document in the

history of all mankind where the words

"at-will" are

10

used on a South Jordan piece of paper to refer to Dan

11

Pearson prior to this document dated January 30,

12

2007?

13
14

A.

A South Jordan piece of paper, meaning a

letterhead?

15

Q.

Anything.

16

A.

Give me a moment to think.

17
18

I can't recall anything.
Q.

You drafted this document and you were

19

careful to use the words "at-will" on that first

20

sentence there, weren't you?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And if you go to what apparently was filed

23

here with the Department of Workforce Services,

24

somebody wrote in there a discharge, "Discharge of

25

at-will employee," and then somebody even cited the

CITIC0URT, LLC
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1

I status.

2

I

MR. W A L L :

3

approach

him with

4

in Midvale?

5

what you --

So that's why you didn't

something similar

You thought you already

6

DAN PEARSON:

to what you had
had it?

It was solidified.

Is that

It was

7

as clear

as day and night when I came here, and the

8

person in charge of human resources, she was in

9

charge of human

resources and provided

a form to me

10

that I and her both signed, and it spelled

11

out.

12

point forward

There was no question in my mind

13

it right

from

that

at all.

MR. W A L L :

Did she ever comment on what

14

your status was other than the letter, other than the

15

offer?

16
17

DAN PEARSON:
conversations

I didn't have any other

with her.

18

MR. W O L T H I U S :

Go ahead, G r e g .

19

MR. GEILMANN:

Before Mr. Skordas

20

if I could

grab that letter, and I will have

21

make a copy of it.

22

MR. SKORDAS:

23

MR. W O L T H I U S :

Of Mr. Skordas's

MR.

The

24
25

Phil

You made c o p i e s , didn't

March 6?
GEILMANN:

begins,

memorandum.

CITICOURT, LLC

you?

letter of

1

I Signed documents, prepared things.

No question about

2

I it.

I knew that day

He lost the election in 1994.

3

that I had lost my job.

4

public servant again.

5

seven years; merit, went through the whole

6

probationary thing, and I understood that.

7

And I have never worked as a
I had a very good job for

Similarly with Dan, he worked for Midvale

8

City, worked his way up.

And as an employee there,

9

he understood that he had merit status.

In fact, he

10

even had a fall-back position, as you would expect

11

any agency would have, because you want to promote

12

from within instead of do what happened to me, which

13

is promote to where you actually lose your better

14

employees by virtue of some political or other

15

factor.

16

left that job except for the inducement that he had

17

at South Jordan City.

18

He had a great job there.

He wouldn't have

Now, let me talk to you a little about

19

contract law.

Any ambiguity, and any lawyer will

20

tell you this, that ambiguities in a contract are

21

always held against the drafter of the contract.

22

That's contract law 101.

23

listen to Mr. Horst when he was asked about the first

24

document here, July 15, 2002.

25

"Where does it say Dan is an at-will employee," and

And it was interesting to

When I asked him,

CITIC0URT, LLC

1

he said, "Well, it doesn't say that he's not,"

2

that's an ambiguity.

3

contract.

4

treated him in every way as though he was a

5

protected, merit employee.

6

over.

South Jordan wrote

the

They wrote the job d e s c r i p t i o n .

7

They induced

They have the ability, all

Well,

They

him to come

the brilliant

8

legal resources in the County to draft contracts and

9

sit down and say, "You are at-will.

You are not.

10

will take care of you.

11

they didn't.

12

that they should

13

they didn't, that should be held against

14

You are on your own."

But

And the law, the basics of the law are
have done that.

And

to the extent

They actually, if you read

them.

this over, put

15

him on, as you would expect, a six-month

16

period.

17

on a six-month probationary period

18

at-will employee?

19

always on probationary?

20

make?

21

He passed that.

probationary

W e l l , what good would it be to put

somebody

if they are an

If they are a t - w i l l , aren't

they

What difference does it

But Dan went through the probationary

22

We

period.

Every year thereafter they gave him

23

evaluations.

Again, if he is an at-will

24

why would you do that?

25

You can fire him, do anything you w a n t .

employee,

What difference does it make?

CITICOURT, LLC

They

treated

1

I him in ever

2

J turned 50 years old and didn't fit into

3

respect as a merit employee until

he

their

structure.

4

And again, him leaving

South Jordan

5

nothing

to do with performance, nothing

6

e v a l u a t i o n s , nothing to do with p o p u l a r i t y ,

7

everything

8

and I'm

not trying to make this as any

9

because

I'm

to do with money.

And I'm

not an employment

cities, but South Jordan City is going

11

themselves

12

termination

13

is illegal

14

fire them.

15

South Jordan did, they replaced

16

30-year-old

17

to do with
and

telling y o u ,
threat at all

lawyer and I don't

10

Pearson's

It is d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .

to take someone who is 50 years old
Especially
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July 15, 2002

Daniel Pearson
12146 South 4000 West
Riverton, Utah 84065

Dear Daniel:
It is a pleasure to officially extend to you a conditional offer (pending the successful completion
of medical exams, alcohol and drug tests, and other tests that may be required) of employment
with South Jordan City. We are looking forward to having you join our team because of the
outstanding contribution we trust you will make.
To confirm the details of our discussion, you will start work on MeMayP July 1pr, 2002 at 8:00
a.m. in the position of Assistant Police Chief. Your supervisor will be Protective Services
Department Director, Lindsay Shepherd. While a job description will be provided to you as part
of your New Employee Orientation, in brief, you will be responsible for Police operations. I am
sure you will find this to be a very challenging and stimulating job.
Your salary will be paid at the rate of $30.15 per hour/$2,412.00 each two-week pay period
(Exempt Grade E12, Step 6.5). In addition, you are eligible for all of our standard employee
benefits.
We anticipate a long and mutually rewarding relationship. However, you should know that if
your employment is "at will" (for Probationary Employees and Department Heads) there is no
obligation on either you or South Jordan City to continue it for any set length of time. All new
employees are on probation for their first six (6) month period of employment. Passing
probation, however, does not affect your "at-will" status. Probationary and post-probationary
"at-will" employees may be terminated at any time without reason or explanation. The main
difference is that your performance will be monitored more closely during your probationary
period.
Again, congratulations. I look forward to seeing you on July 15, 2002. Until then, please
acknowledge receipt of this job acceptance offer letter by signing this copy and returning it to
me by July 15, 2002. You will receive a copy of this correspondence on July 15, 2002 when you
begin work with South Jordan City. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me.

fVui^u^/j^^r^ *n

Ikfcai

Shelly Chapman
Human Resource Officer

Date

for employment with South Jordan City.

Daniel Pearson
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Mayor^William Kent Money
Council Mambsr-BrJan C. Bulte/s
Council Member-David w, Colton
Council Member-Bradley G, Marior
Council Member-Larry Short
Council Member-Leona Winger

SOUTH JORDAN U1IY

c

^^^^mi

^ Manager-Ricky A. Horst

SOUTH JORDAN

1600 West Towne Center Drive / South Jordan, UT $4095/ Telephone (801) 254-3742 / Fax (801) 254-3393
e-mail: info@sjc.utah.gov http://sjc.utah.gov

Jan. 30,2007
Daniel Pearson
Assistant Police Chief
City of South Jordan
As the Assistant Police Chief, you are currently employed in an "At-Will" position, from
which you may be temiinated at any time, with or without cause or explanation. Your
employment with the City of South Jordan h hereby temiinated, effective at 5:00 pm on
Jan. 30, 2007.
Please contact Chief Shepherd and Human Resources to complete out processing.

^&C&H^
Ricky A, Horst
City Manager
Cc:

Human Resources
File

Received:

Date:
Daniel Pearson

*$

MAYOR-WILLIAM KENT MONE\

^rifiRHLt

CITY M\N\GCR - Ru K> \ HORST

COUNCII MrMBrR - B R K N C BUTTERS
COUNCIL MTMRFR - DAVID W COLTON
COUNCII MI MIII R - BRADI n G. N'URLOR
COUNCTI M i M M R - L \ m n SHORI
COUNCII MKMBFR - LFONA WINGER
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1600 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE / Sou TH JORDAN. UT 84095 / TELEPHONE (801) 254-3742 / FAX (801) 254-3393
email: mfoC^sjc utah.gov hup //sjc titah.gov

February 8, 2007

Daniel L. Pearson
12146 South 4000 West
Riverton,UT 84065
Re:

Request to Appeal

Dear Mr. Pearson:
The City is in receipt of your January 30, 2007 letter, which you ask us to consider a "request to
appeal [your] termination at any and all levels that may apply." You were employed by the City
as its Assistant Police Chief, an at-will position. The Employee Appeals procedure, outlined by
statute and the City's Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. See, Utah Code
Annotated § 10-3-1105(2)(d). There is no appeal available.

A<tU
Ricky A. Horst
City Manager
Cc:

File
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Exhibit D
Dan Pearson Grievances
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SREGORY G. SKORDAS, P.C.

TELEPHONE(801)53 1-7444
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 531-8885

rlARRY CASTON, P.C.
REBECCA C. HYDE, P.C.
3LIVIA D. UlTTO

March 6, 2007
John Geilman
Assistant City Manager
1600 W. Towne Center Dr.
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Re: Step Three Grievance

Dear Assistant City Manager:
Pursuant to and in accordance with the South Jordan City Grievance Procedures, Daniel
Pearson, by and through counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas, hereby submits this Step Three
(3) Grievance regarding his termination from the position of Assistant Police Chief on January
30, 2007.

Grievance Timeline
1.

On January 30, 2007, Ricky A. Horst, South Jordan City Manager, terminated
Dan Pearson from his position as Assistant Police Chief.

2.

On January 31, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to South Jordan City entitled
"Letter of Intent to Appeal Termination," wherein he made a formal request to
appeal his termination at any and all levels that may apply.

3.

On February 8, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to both Mr. Horst and
Lindsay Shepherd, South Jordan Police Chief, again appealing his termination of
January 30, 2007 and requesting that the grievance procedures be followed.

4.

On February 8, 2007, Mr. Horst responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, wherein he
1

stated: u[T]he employee appeals procedure, outline by statute and the City's
Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. There is no appeal
available."
5.

On February 15, 2007, Chief Shepherd responded in a letter to Dan Pearson,
wherein he stated: "It is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to up
hold your termination."

Timeliness of Step Three Grievance
Section 4-07(2)(c) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following:
Step Three - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the immediate
supervisor, the employee may submit a written grievance to their respective
assistant city manager or service group director within 10 working days of the
immediate supervisor's response.
Section 4-07(2)(b) and (d), which define steps two (2) and four (4), clarify the 10 working
day clock as beginning at the time "of receipt" of the correspondence. It would be both
inconsistent and prejudicial to interpret section 4-07(2)(c) as creating a filing time frame far more
limiting on aggrieved employees than on city employees responding to the grievance. Indeed,
interpreting the 10 day clock as beginning on the date of issuance would create an incentive for
use of first class mail as opposed to fax or hand delivery as a mechanism to limit the amount of
time the party has to respond.
In the present case, counsel for Dan Pearson received the letter after the extended
President's Day weekend, on February 20, 2007. Accordingly, the time for submitting a step
three grievance extends to March 6, 2007. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reach the same
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date. Rule 6 begins the computation on the day of mailing, but adds three days to the end of the
proscribed period. Under that standard, the period of 10 working days also extends to March 6,
2007.
Of final note, this Step Three Grievance would have been submitted at a sooner date were
it not for the ambiguity of Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter, which creates some impression
that Dan Pearson was being told that he did not qualify for any review procedure whatsoever.
Grievance of Dan Pearson
It is hereby argued that South Jordan City Manager Ricky Horst was without authority to
terminate Dan Pearson in the manner that he did, and that it was wrongful of Chief Lindsay
Shepherd to uphold that termination. Dan Pearson therefore calls upon the Assistant City
Manager, John Geilman, to correct the error in accordance with proper procedure.
The letter written by Mr. Horst on February 8, 2007, and the letter written by Chief
Shepherd on February 15, 2007, confirm that Dan Pearson's termination was executed on the
belief and assumption that Dan Pearson was an "at-will" employee of South Jordan City. This
assumption is in error.
A.

Statutory Classification

Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter cites Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1105(2)(d) as statutorily
classifying Dan Pearson as an at-will employee. This section of the Utah Code classifies certain
individuals as being at-will. Subsection (2)(b), as cited by Mr. Horst, includes a "deputy police
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chief of the municipality." Dan Pearson, however, was not a deputy police chief at the time of his
termination. Rather, Dan Pearson was an Assistant Police Chief. This position is distinct and
separate from a Deputy Police Chief, just as the City currently employs Gary Whatcott as Deputy
City Manager and John Geilman, Rob Wall and Laurie Tanner as Assistance City Managers.
Accordingly, the City has failed to identify any statutory basis for claiming that he was an at-will
employee at the time of his termination.
B.

South Jordan Written Policy

On July 15, 2002, Dan Pearson accepted the offer for employment as Assistant Police
Chief. He signed an agreement for employment at that time. That agreement stated the following:

"However, you should know that if your employment is "at will" (for Probationary
Employees and Department Heads) there is no obligation on either you or South Jordan
City to continue it for any set length of time."
At the time of his termination, Dan Pearson was not a probationary employee, and was not
a department head. As stated on the current South Jordan City Website: "The Mayor and City
Council appoint the City Manager and City Attorney . . . [and] [t]he City Manager appoints all
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council." The current appointees are
listed as follows: Ricky A. Horst - City Manager, Rob Wall - Assistant City Manager, John
Geilman - City Attorney, Lindsay Shepherd - Police Chief, Gary Whatcott - Deputy City Manager,
Laurie Tanner - Assistant City Manager, and Anna West - City Recorder. This list does not
include an Assistant Police Chief, nor does Dan Pearson have reason to believe that it ever has. In
4

sum, Dan Pearson was at no time provided, nor did he ever see, documentation that described him
as an at will employee.
C.

Verbal Representations

South Jordan City employees generally represented to Dan Pearson at the time of his
recruitment, hire and throughout his service that after his probationary period he would be a
tenured, merit employee, and not an at-will employee. In addition, Dan Pearson engaged in
several conversations with Chief Lindsay Shepherd about Mr. Pearson becoming Police Chief,
wherein Dan Pearson stated to Chief Shepherd that he lacked interest in the position because he
did not want up give up his job security. Chief Shepherd made no comments in response that
indicated that Dan Pearson's belief of current job security was erroneous.
Based on the above, Dan Pearson requests that the Assistant City Manager carefully
review the issue of his employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and representations
made to him.
DATED this ( /

day of March, 2007.

SKORDA5, CASTON & HYDE, LLC

Gre|bryNjr. Skordas
\
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tEBECCA C. HYDE, P.C.
)LIV1A D. UlTTO

March 19, 2007
Employee Appeals Board
City Recorder's Office
1600 W. Towne Center Dr.
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Re: Step Five Grievance
Dear Employee Appeals Board:
Pursuant to and in accordance with the South Jordan City Grievance Procedures, Daniel
Pearson, by and through counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas, hereby submits this Step Five
(5) Grievance regarding his termination from the position of Assistant Police Chief on January
30, 2007.
Grievance Timeline
1.

On January 30, 2007, Ricky A. Horst, South Jordan City Manager, terminated
Dan Pearson from his position as South Jordan Assistant Police Chief.

2.

On January 31, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to South Jordan City entitled
"Letter of Intent to Appeal Termination," wherein he made a formal request to
appeal his termination at any and all levels that may apply.

3.

On February 8, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a letter to both Mr. Horst and
Lindsay Shepherd, South Jordan Police Chief, again appealing his termination of
January 30, 2007, and requesting that the grievance procedures be followed.

4.

On February 8,2007, Mr. Horst responded in a letter to Dan Pearson, wherein he
stated: "[T]he employee appeals procedure, outline by statute and the City's
Handbook, does not apply to an Assistant Police Chief. There is no appeal
available."

1

5.

On February 15, 2007, Chief Shepherd responded in a letter to Dan Pearson,
wherein he stated: "It is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to
uphold your termination."

6.

On March 6, 2007, Dan Pearson submitted a Step 3 Grievance to John Geilman,
South Jordan Assistant City Manager, requesting review of all prior
determinations. The letter clearly stated Mr. Pearson's argument with respect to
his termination of employment. Specifically, the letter detailed three independent
grounds upon which Mr. Pearson claims he was not an at-will employee. In
addition, the letter specifically addressed the timeliness of the letter sufficient to
established the grievance as being filed in a timely manner.

7.

On March 19, 2007, John Geilman responded to the Step Three Grievance. Mr.
Geilman denied Dan Pearson's grievance on both procedural and substantive
grounds, first stating that the grievance was untimely and then upholding the
termination on the grounds that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. While Mr.
Geilman's letter purported to comply with Step 4 of the grievance process, which
requires that the assistant city manager respond in a manner "detailing his/her
decision," the response held Mr. Pearson's Step 3 Grievance untimely without
responding to Mr. Pearson's assertion of timeliness. In addition, the response
upheld Chief Shepherd's finding that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee
without factual support and without acknowledgment of the arguments raise by
Mr. Pearson.
Timeliness of Step Five Grievance

Section 4-07(2)(e) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following:
Step Five - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the assistant city
manager or service group director, and the action involves a termination,
suspension without pay for more than two days, or involuntary transfer from one
position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may
submit a written request to the employee appeals board through the city recorder's
office within 10 working days of receipt of the assistant city manager or service
group leader response.
The Step 4 response from John Geilman was sent and received by fax on March 19, 2007.
Ten working days of March 19, 2007 is April 2, 2007. This Step 5 Grievance is being submitted
to the City Recorder's Office on March 21, 2007.
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Availability of Step 5 Greivance
As quoted above, the Step 5 Grievance provision allows any employee "not satisfied with
the [Step 4] response of the assistant city manager" to appeal that decision to the Employee
Appeals Board. To the extent that Mr. Geilman's Step 4 response purports to extinguish Mr.
Pearson's right to submit a Step 5 Grievance, Mr. Pearson seeks to appeal that decision to the
Board as well. Mr. Geilman's response provides no reason for his finding of untimeliness, and
fails to acknowledge Mr. Pearson's supported assertion that his grievance was in fact timely.
Moreover, Mr. Geilman gives no support for his implied statement that only a "court of
competent jurisdiction" may review his determination of untimeliness. Mr. Pearson argues that
the Employee Appeals Board is more than qualified to review all prior determinations of each
city employee throughout the grievance process, including determinations of timeliness. Mr.
Pearson does note, however, that the Board may be aided by consideration of how a local court
would assess the issue.
Grievance of Dan Pearson
It is hereby argued that South Jordan City Manager Ricky Horst was without authority to
terminate Dan Pearson in the manner that he did, that it was wrongful of Chief Lindsay Shepherd
to uphold that termination, and that Assistant City Manager John Geilman erred in finding the
Step 3 Grievance untimely and in upholding all prior determinations. Dan Pearson therefore
calls upon the Employee Appeals Board to conduct a hearing and review the appropriateness of
his termination, as specified in the section 4-08 of the South Jordan City Employee Handbook.
The following briefly outlines Mr. Pearson's arguments in this matter. A more complete
argument will be offered at the appropriate hearing or through briefing as requested by the Board.
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A.

Timeliness of Step Three Grievance

Section 4-07(2)(c) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states the following:
Step Three - If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the immediate
supervisor, the employee may submit a written grievance to their respective
assistant city manager or service group director within 10 working days of the
immediate supervisor's response.

The above provision alone does not expressly state when the 10 working day clock
begins; i.e. upon mailing of the letter or upon receipt by the other party. Sections 4-07(2)(b), (d)
and (e), however, which define steps two (2), four (4) and five (5), clarify the 10 working day
clock as beginning at the time "of receipt" of the correspondence. Step Five, in particular, grants
the aggrieved employee ten days after "receipt" of the assistant city managers response,
demonstrating that the "receipt" based time clock is afforded to both aggrieved employee and city
respondent. Step One is also consistent with this time calculation in that the action of
termination is not complete until the employee is notified.
It would be extremely inconsistent and grossly prejudicial to interpret section 4-07(2)(c)
as creating a filing time which begins upon the date of mailing. First, the interpretation would
create an unexplained exception to the rule followed at "all" other steps. Such a "one time"
exception makes no sense in the context of Step 3 Grievances, and would greatly increase the
likelihood of innocent error on behalf of the aggrieved party or their counsel. Second, the
interpretation would place a much greater hardship on aggrieved employees than on the city
employees responding to their grievances. While city employees would still be granted a full ten
working days to formulate their reply, the aggrieved party could be forced to submit their Step 3
Grievance in as little as 5 working days. Third, the interpretation would choose a standard and
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regulated response time into one dictated by the method of transmitting the decision. Such
would create an incentive for use of first class mail as opposed to fax or hand delivery as a
mechanism to limit the amount of time the party has to respond.
In the present case, counsel for Dan Pearson received the letter after the extended
President's Day weekend, on February 20, 2007. Accordingly, the time for submitting a step
three grievance extended to March 6, 2007. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reach the same
date. Rule 6 begins the computation on the day of mailing, but adds three days to the end of the
proscribed period. Under that standard, the period of 10 working days also extended to March 6,
2007.
B.

Wrongfulness of At-Will Determination

i. Statutory Classification
Mr. Horst's February 8, 2007, letter cites Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1105(2)(d) as statutorily
classifying Dan Pearson as an at-will employee. This section of the Utah Code classifies certain
individuals as being at-will. Subsection (2)(b), as cited by Mr. Horst, includes a "deputy police
chief of the municipality." Dan Pearson, however, was not a deputy police chief at the time of his
termination. Rather, Dan Pearson was an Assistant Police Chief. This position is distinct and
separate from a Deputy Police Chief, just as the City currently employs Gary Whatcott as Deputy
City Manager and John Geilman, Rob Wall and Laurie Tanner as Assistant City Managers.
Accordingly, the City has failed to identify any statutory basis for claiming that he was an at-will
employee at the time of his termination,
ii. South Jordan Written Policy
On July 15, 2002, Dan Pearson accepted the offer for employment as Assistant Police
5

Chief He signed an agreement for employment at that time. That agreement stated the following:

"However, you should know that if your employment is uat will" (for Probationary
Employees and Department Heads) there is no obligation on either you or South Jordan
City to continue it for any set length of time."
At the time of his termination, Dan Pearson was not a probationary employee, and was not
a department head. As stated on the current South Jordan City Website: "The Mayor and City
Council appoint the City Manager and City Attorney . . . [and] [t]he City Manager appoints all
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council." The current appointees are
listed as follows: Ricky A. Horst - City Manager, Rob Wall - Assistant City Manager, John
Geilman - City Attorney, Lindsay Shepherd - Police Chief, Gary Whatcott - Deputy City Manager,
Laurie Tanner - Assistant City Manager, and Anna West - City Recorder. This list does not
include an Assistant Police Chief, nor does Dan Pearson have reason to believe that it ever has. In
sum, Dan Pearson was at no time provided, nor did he ever see, documentation that described him
as an at will employee.
iii. Verbal Representations
South Jordan City employees generally represented to Dan Pearson at the time of his
recruitment, hire and throughout his service that after his probationary period he would be a
tenured, merit employee, and not an at-will employee. In addition, Dan Pearson engaged in
several conversations with Chief Lindsay Shepherd about Mr. Pearson becoming Police Chief,
wherein Dan Pearson stated to Chief Shepherd that he lacked interest in the position because he
did not want up give up his job security. Chief Shepherd made no comments in response that
indicated that Dan Pearson's belief of current job security was erroneous.

6

Based on the above, Dan Pearson requests that the Appeals Board follow the review
procedures, including the holding of a hearing, and subsequently review the issue of his
employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and representations made to him.
DATED this 2 ' day of March, 2007.

SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC

G. Skordas
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Fax: (801) 253-2210

Lindsay D. Shepherd
Chief of Police

February 15, 2007
Daniel L Pearson
12146 South 4000 West
Riverton, UT 84065
Greg Skordus, Esq.
Attorney at Law
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Employee Grievance for Action Taken

Dear Mr Pearson:
The City is in receipt of your February 8, 2007 letter, in which you serve notice grieving the
action taken against [you] and demanding that South Jordan City grievance procedure be
followed.
This letter is written pursuant to the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, and is a
response to your grievance. The facts detailing my decision regarding your grievance are that
you were employed by South Jordan City as an Assistant Police Chief, an appointed at will
employee. Based on those facts, it is my decision, as your former immediate supervisor, to up
hold your termination as an appointed-at will employee.
'674/44
i^clsay Shepherd
ief of Police
C:

File
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March 19, 2007
Daniel L. Pearson
12146 South 4000 West
Riverton, UT 84065
Greg Skordus, Esq.
Attorney at Law
341 South Main Street
Salt Lake City,UT 84111
Re:

Employee Grievance for Action Taken

Dear Mr. Pearson and Mr. Skordus:
This letter is notice that the grievance for action taken filed on March 6, 2007 with the
Office of the undersigned as Step Three of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance
Procedure by Mr. Daniel L, Pearson was not timely filed. Therefore, this Office does not
deem a response to be required to the untimely filed grievance. Further, due to the
untimely filing of the grievance by Mr. Daniel L. Pearson, the grievance process has been
completed and Step Four and Step Five of the City Grievance Procedure are not available
to Mr. Pearson.
In the alternative, should a court of competent jurisdiction rule that Mr. Pearson's Step
Three response was timely filed, and that Mr. Pearson is entitled to proceed to Step Four
of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, the following is given only to
preserve the City's right to proceed to Step Four of the said Grievance Procedure and to
respond to Mr. Pearson's grievance accordingly.
The Office of the undersigned was at the time relevant to the separation of Mr. Pearson
from the employ of South Jordan City the Office of the Assistant City Manager over the
Health, Safety and Legal Group, The Police Department was attached to this Group and
thus the requirement in Step Three of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance
Procedure would require Mr. Pearson to address a grievance to the undersigned.
I am in receipt of Mr. Pearson's grievance dated March 6,2007 wherein, among other
things, Mr. Pearson's Counsel asks that the "Assistant City Manager carefully review the
issue of [Mr. Pearson's] employment status, in light of the relevant policies, law and
representations made to [Mr. Pearson]".

DISCIPLINED THOUGHT • DISCIPLINED PEOPLE • DISCIPLINED ACTION

Step Four of the South Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure requires a written
response to be submitted to the employee grievance within 10 working days of receipt of
the grievance. The grievance was received by the undersigned's Office on March 6,
2007. Ten working days, including the day of receipt of the grievance, is March 19,
2007.
The legal alternative contained in this letter is written pursuant to Step Four of the South
Jordan City Employee Grievance Procedure, and is a response to Mr. Pearson's
grievance. The facts detailing my decision regarding Mr. Pearson's grievance are that he
was employed by South Jordan City as an Assistant Police Chief, an appointed at will
employee. Based on those facts, it is my decision, as Mr. Pearson's former Assistant City
Manager, to up hold his termination as an appointed at will employee.

^/John H. Geilmann
Assistant City Manager
C:

File
Camille N. Johnson
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City Manager-Ricky A, Horst

Mayar-WIlIiam KGHI Mcnsy

Council Member-Brian G. Butters
Cooncfl Merrfcer-Oavid W. Cotton
Council Msmbor-Bradley & Marior
Cot/ncH Manser-Larry Short
Council Member-Leona Winger

SoOTtrlORDAN

\ 600 West Towne Center Drive / South Jordan, UT 84095/ Telephone (801) 254-3742 / Fax (801) 254-3393
e-mail infe@slc.ulah.gov hflptfsjc.utati.gov

April 30,2007
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Anna West
South Jordan City Recorder
Re: Grievance of Daniel Pearson
Dear Anna:

Please be advised that "the Employee Appeals Board of South Jordan City has
deliberated regarding the grievance fled by Daniel Pearson and has reached a decision.
Based upon the grievance filed, the Board determined that there were two issues for the
Board's consideration. The conclusion of the Board is as follows:
1. Was the grievance filed in a tjmely fashion as required by the South Jordan
City Employee Handbook? The Board determined that the grievance was
timely filed.
2. Was Daniel Pearson an "at will" employee? The Board a^termraed that Mr.
Pearson was an "at wilT employee.
5y each, of
above^results.

'attires below, the respective board members certify to the

e/u*^f
)NALD C. WOLTHUIS

SUZAipJERUAKK:
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Exhibit F
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition

CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (5494)
JUDITH D. WOLFERTS (7023)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Respondent
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Fax:(801)363-0400

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
WEST JORDAN, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL PEARSON,
Appellant,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL

vs.
Case No. 070418144
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN,
Judge Terry Christiansen
Respondent.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Respondent City of South Jordan (the "City") submits this memorandum in support of its
Motion for Summary Disposition. The City's Motions asks the Court to dismiss appellant Daniel
Pearson's ("Mr. Pearson") appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION
This "appeal" involves a terminated City employee, Daniel Pearson, whose employment
was at-will and who accordingly had no statutory due process appeal rights. Disregarding this

lack of statutory rights, Mr. Pearson has attempted to parlay a grievance procedure that is
contained in the City's Employee Handbook into a right to judicial appellate review of the City's
Employee Appeals Board's decision that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. The Utah Court
of Appeals has already rejected Mr. Pearson's approach and found that it has no jurisdiction over
such review. This court should likewise find that it has no jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's
Petition for Review of the Employee Appeals Board's actions, since none of the jurisdictional
bases for a district court's appellate review are present.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In July 2002, Mr. Pearson was hired by the City as assistant chief of police. See

Conditional Offer of Employment (July 15, 2002), attached as Ex. A.
2.

Under the City's job description, an assistant police chief is second in command

in the police department and has general supervisory authority over all department personnel:
General Purpose
Assumes total responsibility for the [police] department in the absence of the
Public Safety Director; assists in the development of departmental programs;
performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the Chief.
Supervision Received
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety Director.
Assumes departmental responsibility in the absence of the Chief of Police.
Supervision Exercised
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly or through
subordinate supervisors.
See Job Description, Assistant Police Chief, attached as Ex. B; see also South Jordan City Police
Department Employment Chart, attached as Ex. C.

ii

3.

On January 30, 2007, Mr. Pearson was terminated from his position as assistant

police chief. See Termination Letter (Jan. 30, 2007), attached as Ex. D. The letter of termination
stated that he was an at-will employee. See id.
4.

Utah statutes dictate which municipal employment positions have due process

rights, as opposed to those which are at-will and do not have due process rights. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-3-1105 &-1106.
5.

Under Utah law, a "deputy police chief and a "deputy of the head of a municipal

department" are at-will employees and have no entitlement to due process upon termination:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold
employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over
two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as
provided in Section 10-3-1106.l
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) a police chief of the municipality;
(b) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105.
6.

The day after he was terminated, Mr. Pearson sent the City a GRAMA request for

a copy of his personnel file, a copy of the City's Employee Handbook, and copies of all sections

]

The Utah legislature has specified the due process entitlements of municipal employee
positions that are not at will, which includes an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from "any
final action or order of [a municipality's] appeal board." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a).
in

of the City's Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual that refer to, among other
things, terminations and appeals of termination. See GRAMA Request from Pearson (Jan. 31,
2007), attached as Ex. E.
7.

The day after he was terminated, Mr. Pearson also delivered to the City a letter

regarding his "Notice of Intent to Appeal Termination." See Notice of Intent Letter (Jan. 31,
2007), attached as Ex. F.
8.

On February 8, 2007, Mr. Pearson faxed to the City a letter regarding "Notice of

Appeal, Grievance and Legal Representation." See Notice of Appeal (Feb. 8, 2007), attached as
Ex. G. The letter stated that it was an appeal of his termination, and that if an appeal was refused
the letter was notice of his intention to grieve his termination under the City's grievance
procedure:
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to South Jordan City Policy, I am formally appealing my
termination of January 30, 2007. I am also notifying you that if you refuse to
grant me the appeal I am entitled to, I hereby notify you that this letter will serve
as my notice grieving the action taken against me and demanding that the South
Jordan City grievance procedure be followed.
See id. (emphasis added).
9.

The City sent a letter to Mr. Pearson on February 8, 2007, which stated it had

received his request for an appeal, but that the appeals procedure in the Employee Handbook did
not apply to him because his position as assistant police chief was at-will. Letter to Pearson from
Ricky Horst (City Manager) (Feb. 8, 2007), attached as Ex. H.
10.

On or about March 19, 2007, Mr. Pearson's attorney sent a letter to the Employee
iv

Appeals Board in which he detailed the "grievance timeline" process that Mr. Pearson had
followed since his termination. See Letter from Gregory Skordas to Employee Appeals Board
(dated Mar. 21, 2007), attached as Ex. I. The "timeline" in the letter noted that Mr. Pearson was
at the final step ("step 5") in the grievance pursuant to § 4-07(2)(e) of the City's Employee
Handbook. See id,
11.

Section 4-07(2)(e) of the City's Employee Handbook states that:

Step Five-If the employee is not satisfied with the response of the assistant city
manager or service group director, and the action involves a termination,
suspension without pay for more than two days, or involuntary transfer from one
position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may
submit a written request to the employee appeals board through the city recorder's
office within 10 working days of receipt of the assistant city manager or service
group leader response.
See Employee Handbook, § 4-07, attached as Ex. J.
12.

The Employee Appeals Board agreed to hear the grievance to address the at-will

issue. Mr. Pearson was permitted to call witnesses at the hearing, and he testified on his own
behalf The Board concluded he was an at-will employee. See Decision of Grievance of Daniel
Pearson, attached as Ex. K.
13.

On May 10, 2007, Mr. Pearson filed a Petition in the Utah Court of Appeals for

review of the Employee Appeals Board's decision. See Petition for Review (May 10, 2007),
attached as Ex. L. The Petition stated the jurisdictional basis for appeal as Utah R.App. P. 14
and Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the City's Employee Handbook. See id.
14.

Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the City's Employee Handbook states:

v

Decision of Employee Appeals Board Hearing
a.
Each decision of the employee appeals board shall be certified to the city
recorder within 15 days from the final day of the appeals hearing . . . .
b.
In the event the employee appeals board does not uphold the suspension,
demotion or termination, the city recorder shall certify the decision to the
employee affected, and also to the assistant city manager or service group
director from whose order the appeal was taken. If the board does not
uphold the suspension, demotion or termination, the board shall provide in
its order:
c.

Any final action or order of the board may be appealed by either the employee or
the City to the Utah Court of Appeals . . .

Employee Handbook § 4-08, attached as Ex. M.
15.

Mr. Pearson's Petition to the Utah Court of Appeals asked the court to review the

Employee Appeals Board's "decision that [Mr. Pearson] was an at will employee at the time of
his termination from the position of South Jordan City Assistant Police Chief" See Petition for
Review.
16.

On September 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on its own motion.

See Order (Sept. 10, 2007), attached as Ex. N. The Order states that pursuant to Utah R.App.P.
44, the Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction. See id.
17.

The Court of Appeals transferred the Petition for Review to Third District Court

in West Jordan. See Remittitur (Sept. 10, 2007), attached as Ex. O.

vi

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER REVIEW OF THE EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD'S DECISION.
The Court of Appeals correctly found it has no jurisdiction under Utah R.App.P. 14 over

Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review. Rule 14 states that judicial review by the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals of orders or decision of administrative agencies, commissions or committees is
allowed only when such review is "provided by statute." See Utah R.App.P. 14(a). By its
decision, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that there is no statute on which it can rely for
jurisdiction to review the Employee Appeals Board's decision. Mr. Pearson was employed by
the City as assistant police chief. As such, he was excluded under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
from the right to due process, and also excluded from the right to judicial review set forth in §
10-3-1106. Moreover, §§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 apply only to terminations, suspensions without
pay of more than two days, and involuntary transfers to a position with less remuneration. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(1). They do not apply to decisions as to whether an employee is atwill, which was the issue before the Employee Appeals Board. See id. Accordingly, there was
no statutory basis for judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals.
II.

THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER MR. PEARSON'S PETITION
FOR REVIEW.
Just like the Court of Appeals, this Court also has no jurisdiction to review a decision of

the City's Employee Appeals Board. A district court's appellate jurisdiction is set forth in the
Utah Code, which states that:

1

(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a)
agency adjudicative procedures as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative procedures; and
(b)
municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3703.7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (Jurisdiction of District Court/Appeals). Thus, the district court's
appellate review jurisdiction applies broadly only to state agencies, and with regard to
municipalities applies only to review of "an adjudicative hearing for a violation of a civil
municipal ordinance." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4; § 10-3-703.7; § 64-46b-l; § 63-46b-2(b).
Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review does not meet these standards.
First, with regard to the jurisdiction2 established by part (7)(a) of the statute, "agency" is
defined in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") to include only state agencies:
"Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council,
office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, including the
agency head, agency employees, and other persons acting on behalf of or under
the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the legislature, the courts, the
governor, any political subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a
political subdivision of the state.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2 (emphasis added) (APA definitions); see also Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-1 (setting forth actions of state agencies that are reviewable). Thus, this Court cannot rely
on Part 7(a) to establish jurisdiction over Mr. Pearson's Petition for Review of the City's

2

The APA makes clear that "Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(8).
2

Employee Appeals Board's decision.
Second, the jurisdiction established by part 7(b) applies only to reviews of "municipal
administrative proceedings," and the Employee Appeals Board's decision does not fall within
that definition. The "municipal administrative proceeding" set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3703.7 is defined as "an adjudicative hearing for a violation of a civil municipal ordinance." Id. §
10-3-703.7(1). Mr. Pearson does not allege a violation of a "civil municipal ordinance"; the only
issue here is a procedure set forth in the City's Employee Handbook. Indeed, an Employee
Handbook does not even meet the requirements to be a "municipal ordinance" as set forth in
§§ 10-3-701 through -719. For example, the statute requires that the "administrative proceeding"
to be reviewed must have been conducted by an administrative law judge (see id. § 10-3703.7(2)(b)), which did not occur with Mr. Pearson because the Employee Appeals Board
conducted the hearing.
Finally, although the Employee Handbook states that appeal can be to the Utah Court of
Appeals, that applies only with regard to employees with a due process right under Utah Code
Ann. S 10-3-1106. As assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson does not have that statutory right,
which the Utah Court of Appeals implicitly recognized by finding it had no jurisdiction over his
Petition for Review. Furthermore, there is no Utah case law that states that an employee
handbook can be a source of subject matter jurisdiction for appellate review, even when the
handbook is that of a municipality.

3

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City asks this Court to dismiss Mr. Pearson's Petition for
Review due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Dated this

of December, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ison
Judith D. Wolferts
Attorneys for City of South Jordan
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Exhibit G
List of South Jordan Appointed Positions
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Elected and Appointed Officials
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Manager form of government View the organizational
chart
The elected officials in office are
For More Info
City Hall
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G3 City Council
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Mayor W Kent Money
Council Member Larry Short (Districts)
Council Member Bradley G Marlor (District 2)
Council Membei Brian C Butters (District 3)
Council Member Leona Winger (District o
Council Member David W Colton (District 4)

IE View a map of district boundaries

The Mayor and City Council appoint the City Manager fr City Attorney The City Manager appoints all
Department Heads upon the advise and consent of the City Council
The current appointees are
City Manager

Ricky A Horst

Assistant City Manager

Rob Wall

City Attorney

John Geilman

Police Chief

Lindsay Shepherd

Deputy City Manager

Gary Whatcott

Assistant City Manager

Laurie Tanner

City Recorder

Anna West

\sl City Manager and Senior Staff
You can also access contact information for any elected or appointed official
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Exhibit H
Assistant Police Chief Job Description

South Jordan City
Job Description
(Title:
Department:
Division:
Classification:

Assistant Police Chief
Public Safety
Police
Exempt

Code:
Effective Date:
Last Revised:
Pay Scale:

POL006
03/2002 j
02/2004
Grade P-14

GENERAL PURPOSE
Assumes total responsibility of the department in the absence of the Public Safety Director; assists in the
development of departmental programs; performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the
Chief.
SUPERVISION RECEIVED
Works under the broad guidance and direction of the Public Safety Director. Assumes departmental responsibility
in the absence of Chief of Police.
SUPERVISION EXERCISED
Provides general supervision to all department personnel, directly or through subordinate supervisors.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
Assists the Public Safety Director in department budget preparation by projecting anticipated purchases and project
costs related to personnel needs, training and technical equipment; monitors compliance with established budgets
and fiscal guidelines; acts as department procurement officer, prepares bid specifications for various department
purchases; searches funding alternatives and writes applications for grants; administers grant programs under the
direction of the police chief; reviews and approves all purchase orders and requisition forms; orders equipment and
supplies.
Assists Public Safety Director in personnel matters such as recruitment, selection, promotion, transfers and
disciplinary actions; coordinate oral review boards; conducts performance evaluations on positions reporting directly
to the lieutenant; oversees quality of overall departmental performance management functions.
Monitors departmental compliance with established standard operating procedures; assists in the development and
implementation of quality control guidelines; makes recommendations for changes in policies and procedures and
implements changes upon approval; serves as department internal affairs investigator; processes and resolves all
charges and allegations brought against department personnel.
Writes general orders and interdepartmental communications as needed and as directed by the Chief of Police;
oversees, performs or delegates the preparation of departmental duty roster and verifies that shifts have been
properly filled.
Develops in-house training curriculum to promote the enhancement of officer knowledge, skills and abilities;
maintains records of training completed by personnel; oversees department FTO program for new hires; conducts
traffic school for violators.
Acts as press release officer; screens and reviews all police reports and communications to assure compliance with
department policy, decisions and protocol: monitors general activities of the department to assure compliance with
standard operating procedures; represent Police Department at public meetings as necessary; communicates city
concerns and needs; delivers city position on issues affecting multiple jurisdictions; sets on regional/county training
board; acts as member of district school safety council.
Responds to all major incidents; commands department special response team; may manage an investigative case
load of major felony crimes; handles rape and homicide cases; follows-up and insures completion of all cases;

Assistant Police Chief, page2

assures timely delivery of case documents to county attorney or courts; conducts research and pursues clues, makes
telephone calls, tracks criminal histories, secures existing information on suspects, etc.; apprehends and arrests
suspects.
As needed and in the absence of the sergeant, exercises close supervision over patrol units and investigation
personnel; monitors work in divisions such as daily incidents, arrests and bookings to ensure compliance with
established procedures; review reports and booking records; provide back-up to patrol division as necessary;
receives and investigates citizen complaints against police officers; supervise and participate in major criminal
investigations as necessary.
Represent Police Department at public meetings as necessary; communicates city concerns and needs; delivers city
position on issues affecting multiple jurisdictions.
Coordinates local, state, and federal law enforcement programs. Makes final recommendation on development of
departmental policies and procedures formulated on the basis of relevant research.
Performs various administrative and managerial duties as assigned by the Chief.
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS
Education and Experience:
A.

B.

C.

A Bachelors degree or equivalent credit hours in law enforcement or related discipline; plus successful
completion of Police Officers Standards and Training Academy (POST);
AND
Ten (10) years of experience in law enforcement, two (2) years of which must have been as a lieutenant or
ten (10) years as a sergeant.
OR
An equivalent combination of education and experience.

Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities:
Policy terminology and practices; municipal and state laws; City and Department policies and procedures;
management, instruction, and supervisory techniques; budgeting, planning and problem solving techniques.
Great responsibility of the care, condition, and use of materials, equipment, money, and tools, and for making
decisions which affect the activities of others; responsible for Police Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Officers, and
non-sworn employees; planning, organizing, and delegating all departmental assignments and responsibilities;
departmental costs and cost methods; acting as an incident officer at hostage situations.
Ability to professionally furnish and obtain information form other departments; frequent contacts with executives
on matters requiring explanation and discussions; contacts with other enforcement agencies; regular and frequent
outside contact with persons of high rank, requiring tact and judgment to deal with and influence people; frequent
contact with press and community groups; requires well developed sense of strategy and timing.
Work Environment:
Great mental effort is required daily: great pressure and fatigue are present in this position due to daily exposure to
deadlines and other job related pressures; occasional exposure to dangerous situations; constant attendance is
required; organize own work, virtual self-supervision.
Applicant must pass a drug test before hire. South Jordan City does not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
national origin, gender, religion, age or disability. South Jordan City is an Equal Opportunity Employer.

Exhibit I
Black's Law Definition of Deputy

deprived child
deprived child. See CHILD.
de raptu virginum (dee rap-t[y]oo vs
in "of the ravishment of virgins'
Deprizio doctrine. Bankruptcy. The rule that a debtor's
taking an appeal in a rape case.
payment to an outside creditor more than 90 days
before a bankruptcy filing is voidable as a preferende rationabilibus divisis (dee rash-£
sis), n [Law Latin "of the fixi
tial transfer if it benefits an inside creditor. Levtt v.
Ingersoll Rand Fin Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. boundaries"] Hist. A writ to sett;
between property owners of diffc
Co.), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). [Cases: Bankone Owner claimed a trespass by th
ruptcy <s=>2608(2). CJ.S. Bankruptcy §§ 138-139.]
de procedendo ad judicium (dee proh-sa-den-doh ad
joo-dish-ee-am), n. [Law Latin "for proceeding in an
assize'*] Hist. A chancery writ ordering a lower court
to proceed to judgment in a case that had been
wrongfully stayed. « If the lower-court justices refused, they could be punished for contempt.
de proprietate probanda (dee pre-pn-a-tay-tee praban-da), n. [Law Latin "for proving property"] Hist.
A writ ordering a sheriff to investigate the ownership
of distrained goods claimed by a defendant in a
replevin action.
"If therefore the distrainor claims any such property, the
party replevying must sue out a writ de proprietate probanda, in which the sheriff is to try, by an inquest, in whom the
property previous to the distress subsisted. And if it be
found to be in the distreinor, the sheriff can proceed no
farther; but must return the claim of property to the court of
king's bench or common pleas, to be there farther prosecuted, if thought advisable, and there finally determined." 3
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
148(1768).

depublished opinion. See OPINION (l).
depute, n. Scots law. A person appointed to act in an
official capacity or as another official's representative.
deputy, n. A person appointed or delegated to act as a
substitute for another, esp. for an official [Cases:
Officers and Public Employees <S=>47. CJ.S. Officers
and Public Employees §§ 350-351, 353.] — deputize,
depute, vb.

de rationabili parte bonorum (dee n
pahr-tee ba-nor-am), n. [Law Lat
share of goods"] Hist. A writ allo\
children of a dead man to recc
share of his goods from his execut
were paid. • This writ was usu. fo
rather than the general law.
de recenti (dee ri-sen-ti). [Law Latin]
ly. © The term adds weight to a
made or an event (such as an a
soon after an incident. In a theft <
the presumption of guilt was grea
pect was identified soon after th
de recordo et processu mittendis (c
proh-ses-[y]oo mi-ten-dis), n. [La
sending of the record and proces
superior court"] A type of writ of ei
derecho de autor. See AUTHOR'S RIGHT.

de recto (dee rek-toh), n. [Law Latin]
recover both the seisin and the ]
termed breve de recto. See WRIT OF COL
de recto de advocatione (dee rek-to
shee-oh-nee), n. [Law Latin "of th<
son"] Hist. A writ restoring a perse
ent a clerk to a benefice when thz
interfered with. • It was abolished
4, ch. 27.

de recto de rationabili parte (dee r
[ee]-8-nay-ba-h pahr-tee), n, [Law '
courtroom deputy. The deputy clerk assigned to a
reasonable part"] Hist. A writ allowi
particular courtroom or a particular judge.
er or blood relative owning land
general deputy. 1. A deputy appointed to act in
obtain a rightful share from the
another officer's place and execute all ordinary
abolished by St. 3 & 4 Will 4, ch. 2'
functions of the office. [Cases: Officers and Public
Employees <s=>47. CJ.S. Officers and Public Employ- de recto patens (dee rek-toh pay-ten
"of right patent"] Hist The high
ees §§ 350-351, 353.] 2. See deputy sheriff under
under the law given to an owner
SHERIFF.
recover the possession and use (
special deputy. A deputy specially appointed to
freehold tenant. — Also termed
serve a particular purpose, such as keeping the
recto.
peace during a riot
de redisseisina (dee ree-dis-see-zin-<

deputy sheriff. See SHERIFF.
DEQ. abbr DELIVERED EX QUAY.

de quarantina habenda (dee kwahr-an-ti-ne ha-benda), n, [Law Latin "of return of quarantine"] Hist. A
writ ordering a sheriff to give a widow possession of
part of her husband's estate, after she had been
wrongfully ejected but before dower is assigned. See
QUARANTINE (4).

de quo (dee kwoh). [Latin] Of which. © These were
formal words used in a writ of entry, as in a writ of
entry "in the quo" or "in the quibus." — Also termed
de quibus.

"of redisseisin"] Hist. A writ for re
rent by a person who had previou
land or rent by an assize of novel
was again disseised by the same dis
is similar to de post disseisina. See I
DISSEISIN.

deregistration, n. The poinl at whid
tration under § 12 of the Securitie
1934 is no longer required becau
the number of holders of the issu
USCA § 78/. Cf DELISTING. [Cases:
tion
<s>35.22.
CJ.S
Seem
§§ 112-114.] — deregister, vb.

Addenda
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103

U.C.A. 1953 §§10-3-1105
Municipal employees—Duration and termination of employment— Exceptions

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold employment
without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided, in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power in the
municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member of the
classified civil service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a municipality's ability to
define cause for an employee termination or reduction in force.

U.C.A. 1953 §§ 10-3-1106
Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer— Appeals—Board—Procedure

(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay,
or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments.
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may,
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a
board to be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7).

(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the
employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the
municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final
disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or
involuntary transfer.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a
copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence
its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the
cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;

(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the
recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).

(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum
of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended
without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of
less remuneration.
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing
with that court a petition for review.

(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final
action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of
determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of members,
the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of
review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under
Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under
Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.

U.C.A. § 77-23a-8
Court order to authorize or approve interception—Procedure
(1) The attorney general of the state, any assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney
general, any county attorney, district attorney, deputy county attorney, or deputy district attorney
specially designated by the county attorney or by the district attorney, may authorize an application to a
judge of competent jurisdiction for an order for an interception of wire, electronic, or oral
communications by any law enforcement agency of the state, the federal government or of any political
subdivision of the state that is responsible for investigating the type of offense for which the application
is made.

U.C.A. § 78A-4-103.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and
process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or
serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the
sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

